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I.

INTRODUCTION

False advertising law has largely escaped constitutional scrutiny because courts
consider false or misleading commercial speech outside the protection ofthe First
Amendment. Even moderate First Amendment protection for truthful commercial
speech, however, requires some constitutional policing ofthe line between truth and
falsity. Current enforcement of false advertising law, whether administrative, as
with the FDA's regulation of drug-related speech, or judicial, as with Lanham Act
suits brought by private parties, is ill-equipped to deal with First Amendment
doctrine's very different concerns, rules, and presumptions. This contribution to the
symposium will explore some of the ways in which the First Amendment and
trademark law-a type of false advertising law-differ in approach. Unlike most
treatments of the subject through a First Amendment lens, this one does not begin
with the presumption that the standard First Amendment approach is superior.
Commercial speech, defined roughly as speech that proposes a commercial
transaction,! has been easier for the government to regulate than political speech
throughout the development of the modern First Amendment. Under the test set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission/

*Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Portions ofthis paper are adapted from
Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LA WAND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds.
forthcoming 2007).
l. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (citing Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
2. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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government may regulate truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech about lawful
activity if the regulation serves a substantial government interest, the regulation
directly advances the government interest, and the regulation is no more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest. 3 This is in contrast to noncommercial speech,
which, even if false, can only be regulated under much more limited circumstances.
The commercial/noncommercial divide has become increasingly controversial
given the importance of commercial speech to modern social, economic, and even
political life, with several Supreme Court Justices suggesting their willingness to
abandon the distinction. 4 Distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial
speech regularly creates definitional problems. 5 Yet the alternative of treating all
falsifiable claims alike might be far less palatable, especially when we consider the
range of commercial speech that is currently regulated to protect consumers against
false or misleading claims. 6 In particular, the Lanham Act and its state counterparts
in trademark and unfair competition law could be profoundly affected as courts
expand protections for commercial speech.
In the past, courts have denied First Amendment protections to advertisers in
trademark and false advertising cases, reasoning that trademark and false
advertising laws pose no constitutional problems because they regulate only false
and misleading commercial speech, which the Supreme Court said in Central
Hudson could simply be banned. 7 The expansion of trademark law to include
protection against dilution, 8 which operates even when consumers are not confused
or deceived, puts obvious pressure on this reasoning. 9 First Amendment concerns

3. [d. at 564.
4. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501, 512 (1996) (Stevens, 1,
plurality); id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 518
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
5. Even for those who accept that commercial speech deserves less First Amendment protection
than political speech, line-drawing can be problematic: What is an ad for an abortion clinic? What is
an ad for Boeing praising the company's contribution to our nation's defense? The former question is
far from theoretical, as anti-abortion groups have begun to sue abortion clinics for false advertising
under consumer protection laws. See, e.g., LifeSite, http://www.lifesite.netlldn/2006/sep/06092109.html
(last visited May 21, 2007) (discussing Expectant Mother Care Frontline Pregnancy suit against a New
York abortion clinic). Likewise, state consumer protection laws have been used to regulate the claims
of anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the New York State
Attorney General, Spitzer Reaches Agreement with Upstate Crisis Pregnancy Center (Feb. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/feb/feb28c_ 02.html (citing concerns ofmisleading
advertising and business practices).
6. See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56
U. ON. L. REV. 1181, 1183-85 (1988) (explaining that commercial speech encompasses not only
commercial advertising but also a wide range of commercial communicative transactions).
7. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563--64 (1980).
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.c. § 1125(c) (2000) (entitling owner ofa famous mark or trade name to
injunction for dilution of the mark and also providing authorization for damages in the case of willful
dilution).
9. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Law as Unconstitutional Restrictions
on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REv. 709, 710 (2007).1 have written about the relationship between
commercial speech doctrine and dilution in Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). This piece will focus on traditional
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have also arisen in trademark infringement claims against classic expressive media
such as movies, which are not commercial speech for First Amendment purposes
even when they are disseminated for profit. 10 Courts have invoked free speech
considerations when evaluating claims against expressive works, and much
commentary has focused on political or expressive uses of trademarks that
trademark owners would prefer to suppress. Most First Amendment analysis ofthe
Lanham Act thus attacks the Act's extension beyond protection against confusion
in sales of ordinary goods and services. 11
But the core of the Lanham Act-its prohibition of commercial uses of words
and symbols that are confusingly similar to words and symbols used by other
commercial entities l2-has remained largely unchallenged. This result is neither
inevitable nor logical. The lines between confusing and informative and between
true and false are difficult to draw; in other contexts-particularly libel
doctrine-courts have therefore imposed increasing burdens on those entities,
whether private or governmental, who would penalize defendants for speech that
is deemed harmful because it is deemed false. As the Supreme Court makes it more
difficult to prohibit truthful commercial speech, then, one likely consequence is an
increased burden of proof on determinations that specific instances of commercial
speech are false or misleading.

II. BACKGROUND: FALSE ADVERTISING
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,13 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects commercial
speech because such speech has informational value for people trying to make
decisions about how to live and even informs opinions on political issues. 14
Increasingly, the Court has justified protection for commercial speech with
reference to the speaker's interests, but I will focus here on the value ofthe speech
to the recipient. Recipient-focused theories should allow more regulation of speech
than speaker-focused theories, given that recipient-focused theories do not consider
the commercial speaker to have a distinct autonomy interest in speaking about its

trademark infringement law as a specific type offalse advertising.
10. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that expression by
means of a motion picture is protected under the First Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death a/Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1710-15 (1999) (arguing that courts should not construe the Lanham Act as a broad
anti-copying statute partly because some commercial uses of a trademark are important in societal
discourse). For an interesting exception, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REv. 1095, 1098-1101 (2003), in which she argues that current protections
for descriptive marks with secondary meaning conflict with First Amendment rights.
12. See Lanham Act, ch. 540, sec. 1,60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2000)).
13. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
14. See id. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
infonnation, that interest may be as keen, ifnot keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate.").
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Despite a number of recent cases striking down specific regulations,16
commercial speech remains less protected than political speech. Regulations of
truthful commercial speech may be suspect, but the Supreme Court tolerates far
more incidental interference with commercial speech than with political speech. For
example, commercial speakers have an interest in being allowed to communicate
truthful information of their own choosing, but no First Amendment interest in
keeping silent about any other facts, even if they are inconvenient. 17 Disclosure
requirements raise the cost of speaking and may distract from the commercial
speaker's intended message. Nonetheless, because the ultimate interest to be
furthered is that of disseminating truthful information, and because the Court has
given little weight to arguments that truthful commercial speech can be chilled by
suppression of untruthful or misleading speech, the distortions produced by
disclosure requirements are not of constitutional magnitude.
The Court's tight focus on freeing truthful commercial speech goes back to the
test articulated in Central Hudson, which has been much criticized but never
successfully replaced. The test has four parts: (1) truthful, nonmisleading speech
may be regulated when (2) the regulation serves a substantial government interest,
(3) the regulation directly advances that government interest, and (4) the regulation
is no more extensive than necessary.18 The government bears the burden of proof, 19
which cannot be satisfied "by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree.,,2o One odd thing about the Central Hudson test
is that a regulation will be sustained if it meets all four prongs of the test, or if it
fails the first prong-that is, ifit deals with false or misleading commercial speech.

15. See. e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 559
(2006) ("Commercial speech receives diminished constitutional protection because '[t]he First
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. '"
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980))).
16. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (finding
unconstitutional an FDA regulation that prohibited manufacturers from advertising compound drugs).
17. See Zauderer V. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) ("Because the
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to
consumers ofthe information such speech provides, ... [a speaker's] constitutionally protected interest
in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal." (citing Va. State Bd.
o/Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764)).
18. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
19. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) ("[T]he Government carries
the burden of showing that the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest 'in a direct
and material way.'" (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))); Bolger V. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983) ("The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial
speech carries the burden ofjustirying it." (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-71)).
20. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71 (citing cases discussing the government's burden).
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In the latter case, the government may simply ban the speech.21 The government
may regulate commercial speech that is "not provably false, or even wholly false,
but only deceptive or misleading" to keep "the stream of commercial information
flow[ing] cleanly as well as freely.,,22
For years, courts and commentators have assailed the Supreme Court's
commercial speech jurisprudence as incoherent at best and anathema at worst. The
controversy, however, has focused on the second through fourth elements. On the
threshold issue of how one determines truth for constitutional purposes, the
Supreme Court has been all but silent, and the academic literature generally little
23
better.
The Supreme Court has been most attentive to the line between true speech and
false or misleading speech in the context of regulating advertising for professional
services,24 a field in which it probably has reason to feel more comfortable
assessing the likelihood of deception than in other areas. For example, in Ibanez v.
Florida Department ofBusiness & Professional Regulation,25 the Court stated that
the government may not assert that commercial speech is "potentially misleading"
to ban it; rather, the government must prove that the speech is actually or inherently
misleading.26

21. As Robert Post points out, misleading speech might be commercial speech that can be
regulated, or it might instead be excluded from the category of "commercial speech" and entirely
outside the First Amendment's coverage, much like contract law and warranties presently. See Robert
Post, The Constitutional Status ofCommercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1,21 (2000); Schauer, supra
note 6. at 1183-84.
22. Va. State Ed. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
23. See. e.g., Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALEJ. ON REG. 85, 130
(1999) ("In most applications of Central Hudson, the first and second prongs of the test are not at issue.
The first prong, concerning whether the speech involves a lawful activity and is not misleading, is
generally uncontroversial."). There are a few exceptions in the literature of false advertising law, but
essentially nothing in the literature of trademark. See, e.g., Lillian R. Be Vier, Competitor Suitsfor False
Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law ofDeception, 78 VA. L. REv.
1,22-25 (1992) (describing judicial discretion in interpreting what constitutes false advertising under
the Lanham Act); Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1454-56 (1990)
(describing situations where government regulation of a product's health claims might or might not
deserve First Amendment protection); Troy, supra, at 130 ("One troubling question that does arise ...
is the breadth of the government's power to restrict speech on the grounds that it is 'misleading. "').
24. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,202 (1982) ("The public's comparative lack of
knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police themselves, and the absence of any
standardization in the 'product' renders advertising for professional services especially susceptible to
abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in controlling."); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 630 (1990) ("Lawyer advertising,
initially an area covered by mainstream commercial speech jurisprudence, became the subject of so
many cases that it developed into its own distinct area of common law.... At present, the law of
attorney advertising has grown to such an extent that it has been able to seal itself off from its roots in
first amendment theory .... ").
25. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
26. See id. at 146 ("[The government's] burden [is] to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. '" (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993))); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (holding that state regulators could
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The Court left itself much room for maneuver by indicating that some speech
is "inherently" misleading without explaining how that category should be defined.
Sometimes the Court has approved broad prophylactic rules against whole
categories of commercial speech, such as in-person solicitation by a lawyer that is
"inherently" likely to involve deception or other misconduct. 27 By contrast, Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission 28 held that, when lawyers'
statements about their certifications and specializations could confuse clients, the
state could require a disclaimer or could screen certifying organizations, but could
not "completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading,"29
again without explaining how to determine misleadingness.
The most we know is that, unsurprisingly, the lawyers on the Court favor more
words rather than fewer-the Court's preferred cure for incomplete or unqualified
claims is more disclosure. 3o In another lawyer advertising case, the Court held that
government "may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information ... if the information also may be presented in a way that
is not deceptive.,,31 Yet even that knowledge is uncertain; the Court has also said
that "there is no First Amendment rule ... requiring a State to allow deceptive or
misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional information
can clarify or offset the effects of the spurious communication."32 Moreover, the
academic research on disclosures and disclaimers reveals that they are rarely
effective when the main message of an ad is confusing or misleading.33 Even
disclaimers that are, on their face, clear and unambiguous rarely affect consumer

ban commercial speech "when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is
inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse").
27. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978).
28. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
29. [d.atIIO.
30. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
31. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; see also id. (suggesting that the state should require a disclaimer
or disclosure as its first choice of remedy for deception).
32. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 12 n.11 (1979); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 466
(holding that a state could ban in-person solicitation for profit "under circumstances likely to pose
dangers that the State has the right to prevent" without showing actual harm to a particular client, and
a broad rule was acceptable because the dangers would materialize often, perhaps "more often than
noC).
33. See, e.g., AlanR. Andreasen, Consumer Behavior Research and Social Policy, in HANDBOOK
OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 459, 482-83 (Thomas S. Robertson & Harold H. Kassarjian eds., 1991)
(arguing that consumers do not often use disclaimers in making decisions); Jacob Jacoby & George J.
Szybillo, Why Disclaimers Fail, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 224, 226 (1994) (listing reasons, including
inattention and information overload, why consumers may not receive messages that sellers direct at
them); CorneliaPechmann, Do Consumers Overgeneralize One-Sided Comparative Price Claims, and
Are More Stringent Regulations Needed?, 33 J. MARKETING RES. 150, 157 (1996) (finding that even
disclosures explicitly correcting erroneous inferences about price superiority were ineffective when the
test ad also made favorable price comparisons); Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics,
the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the Office of Policy Planning of the FTC, Sept. 13,2002, at
16, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/fdatextversion.pdf [hereinafter FTC Comments] C'[T]est results
suggest that consumers may misconstrue some qualifying disclosures as part ofthe seller's promotional
message, thereby reinforcing rather than limiting the claim. ").
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perceptions in the overall context of advertising or packaging.34 Worse, disclosures
and disclaimers can backfire, conveying precisely the opposite message than
intended and reinforcing the original falsehood. 35
Regulatory skeptics are attracted to the idea that government must prove
uncorrectable misleadingness before it can ban speech.36 One problem with paying
attention to what empirically misleads consumers, however, is that consumers are
easily misled. Tn an ad-cluttered world in which it is rational to devote limited time
to comprehending and evaluating most ad claims, significant and persistent
misunderstanding is widespread-all but universal, in fact. 37 If we took
misleadingness seriously, government could ban almost all factual advertising
because of the significant potential for misunderstanding of any factual claim.
Because banning factual ads is unlikely undesirable despite the inevitability of
some consumer deception, false advertising law has a number of doctrines designed
to separate legitimate from illegitimate sources of misunderstanding. 38 These are
most developed in the specialized branch of advertising law that is trademark
infringement law. Descriptive fair use, which allows competitors to use terms that
are literally truthful descriptions of their products even if that generates some
confusion with trademarks incorporating those terms, is one such limiting
doctrine. 39 Nominative fair use is a related concept allowing commercial use of

34. See, e.g., KaylaFriedmann, The Effect ofAdding Symbols to Written Warning Labels on User
Behavior and Recall, 30 HUM. FACTORS 507 (1988) (reporting that even when consumers notice
disclaimers, they are unlikely to use them); Gita Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The Use
ofConcurrent Disclosures to Correct InvalidInferences, 26 J. CONSUMERREs. 307,320 (2000) (fmding
that, because of cognitive processing limitations, "obviously effective disclosures (e.g., those that are
encoded, those that are explicit, etc.) are often ineffective"); David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin,

Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis ofEmpirical
Research, 13 1. PUB. POL'y & MARKETING I, 10 (1994) (summarizing various studies that found
consumers often ignore warning labels even when they read and understand the warnings).
35. See, e.g., FTC Comments, supra note 33, at 40 n.68 ("[I]nformation intended to disclose high
levels of an undesirable nutrient like saturated fat, often led consumers to believe instead that the food
had low or healthy levels of the nutrient.").
36. See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding unjustified the
FDA's characterization of the health claims at issue in the case as "inherently misleading").
37. See JACOB JACOBY & WAYNE D. HOYER, THE COMPREHENSION AND MISCOMPREHENSION OF
PRlNTCOMMUNICATIONS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MASS MEDIA MAGAZINES 110-12 (1987) (finding that
consumers aftinnatively misunderstood an average of 19% of messages in magazine ads; no ad
correctly conveyed its message to all readers, while only 3 of I ,347 respondents completely understood
all four readings on which they were quizzed); JACOB JACOBY, WAYNE D. HOYER, & DAVID A.
SHELUGA, MIS COMPREHENSION OF TELEVISED COMMUNICATIONS 64-73 (1980) (fmding that consumers
misunderstood an average of 28.3% of messages in television commercial ads; 81.3% of consumers
misunderstood at least some portion of those ads, and no ad was completely understood by every
consumer).
38. See, e.g., Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000)
(distinguishing advertising that is misleading from advertising that includes facts that are "susceptible
to misunderstanding").
39. See KP Pennanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. Ill, 118 (2004).
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another's trademark to identify the topic of discussion. 40 Other rules allow most
forms of comparative advertising using another party's mark,41 discount confusion
that results from pure miscomprehension,42 and generally deem confusion that
affects under 20% of consumers to be below the threshold required to find
trademark infringement in the absence of other persuasive evidence of likely
confusion. 43 Currently, however, with the exception of nominative fair use, those
doctrines exist to balance consumer protection with free competition rather than to
implement First Amendment norms. The next section examines trademark
infringement law as commercial speech regulation and finds a number of
inconsistencies. First Amendment commercial speech doctrine and trademark law
cover the same subject matter but make entirely different assumptions about
government's role in determining the truth.

TIT.

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

A.

First Amendment Precedents

The Supreme Court has confronted the First Amendment implications of
trademarks only in unusual factual and legal situations, which has not helped it go
beyond its inconsistent and shallow treatment of deception in commercial speech
cases. In Friedman v. Rogers,44 the Court held that a state law banning the practice
of optometry under a trade name was constitutional because the ban furthered the
state's interest "in protecting the public from ... deceptive and misleading"
practices. 45 The Court distinguished trade names from the commercial speech it had
recently held deserved First Amendment protection. 46 Statements about products
or services and their prices are "self-contained and self-explanatory," but trade
names have "no intrinsic meaning.,,47 Trade names provide no information about
price or service until they acq uire meaning over time. 48 But the Court offered a false
distinction. All words, at least the non-onomatopoetic ones, lack inherent meaning.
If a trade name or other mark can convey misleading information, it can also

40. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307-09 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying the nominative fair use doctrine to two newspaper polls asking readers to identifY
their favorite member of a boy band).
41. See, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618-20 (7th Cir. (995) (holding
that comparative advertising is an acceptable use of a competitor's mark).
42. See, e.g., Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D. Mass. 1993) (discounting
customer confusion of the seller of Dead Dog t-shirts with the Black Dog Tavern); Inc. Publ'g Corp.
v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 397 (S.D.N.Y. (985) (dismissing the likelihood of
confusion ofmagazines offering similar content because of sufficiently differing marks), ajJ'd, 788 F.2d
3 (2d Cir. 1986) (table decision).
43. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32: 188 (4th ed. 2007).
44. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
45. Id. at 15.
46. Jd. at 12-13.
47. Jd.
48. Id.
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convey truthful information, depending on the circumstances.
Nonetheless, the Court was certain that the factual (as opposed to emotional or
potentially misleading) information associated with a trade name could be
communicated directly by advertising price, available services, or the fact of a joint
practice. 49 By contrast, the Court feared that trademark associations with price and
quality remain ill-defined and could be manipulated by trademark owners, creating
a significant possibility that trade names would be used to mislead, for example, by
keeping the same name when staff change. 5o
Thus, the Court credited lower courts' findings that Rogers had used a trade
name "to convey the impression of standardized optometrical care" even though he
did not exercise supervision or control of the services rendered at the various
offices using the trade name. 51 Notably, trademark law would find such a mark
invalid for abandonment, 52 though that would not stop the offices from using it. The
trademark rule suggests a more targeted solution: prohibit use of trade names
without quality contro1. 53 But the Court did not credit that alternative, probably
because it was skeptical of the benefits of trade names generally. Even if use of a
trade name was not misleading, it would still "facilitate the large-scale
commercialization which enhances the opportunity for misleading practices. ,,54 This
apparent opposition to modern industrial practices is part of Friedman's pervasive
conflict with trademark's rationale.
Decided before Central Hudson, Friedman reflects several presumptions that
are inconsistent with subsequent commercial speech doctrine and with the dominant
theory of efficiency that justifies trademark protection generally, which the Court
later endorsed. 55 By treating short-term opportunities to deceive through changes
in quality as more important than long-term incentives to provide a consistent
product, the Court missed the informational efficiency oftrademarks, the ability to
encapsulate in a word or image a constellation of qualities. By serving as shorthand,
trademarks make it easier for consumers to recognize the goods and services they
want. The rule in Friedman required longhand, and the result was, at least

49. See id. at 16.
50. See id. at 12-13. A shady optometrist can use a new trade name if negligence or misconduct
tarnishes the old one, or he can use different trade names for multiple shops to "give the public the false
impression of competition among the shops." [d. at 13.
51. [d. at 14.
52. See. e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing lack of
control as evidence of abandonment).
53. See id.
54. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 15.
55. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) ("In principle,
trademark law, by preventing others from copy ing a source-identifying mark, 'reduce[s1the customer's
costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a potential
customer that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly
marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product. The law thereby 'encouragers1the production of quality products,'
and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's
inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale." (citations omitted».
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according to standard trademark theory, information that was more difficult to
process, meaning that consumers had more difficulty satisfYing their preferences. 56
Under Virginia State Board ofPharmacy, disallowing trade names as shorthand is
a harm to free circulation of relevant information in the marketplace-here the
information that optometric services can be standardized and provided at consistent
quality across offices.
Tn its only return to analyzing the relationship between trademark law and free
speech, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 57
the Court stated that trademark laws that "regulat[ e] confusing uses" of marks are
constitutional because the government "may regulate 'deceptive or misleading'
commercial speech."s8 That reasoning, combined with the idea that trademarks are
valuable property, ended the inquiry. There is no free speech right to use another's
property, at least when there are adequate alternative channels for the defendantspeaker to use to convey its message. Lower courts have explicitly applied similar
property reasoning to ordinary trademarks,59 though the Supreme Court addressed
itself only to the special laws protecting the Olympic marks. For example, the
Second Circuit found that a pornographic film did not need to use the Dallas
Cowboys cheerleaders' trademarks when it could have depicted a fictional team
instead. 60
The property argument is entirely unimpressive with respect to noncommercial,
expressive uses. It is dangerous to let legislatures or common law define intangibles
as "property" to fend off First Amendment challenges. A reputation can be called
property as easily as a trademark-indeed, they are much the same thing-and yet
libel law is pervasively constrained by the First Amendment.
Property concepts are perhaps more persuasi ve with respect to commercial uses

56. The best defense of the Court's reasoning might be that personal services like optometry
cannot be prov ided consistently by a large company, but trademark law does not make this distinction,
and even so that would mean Friedman had no bearing on First Amendment claims for trademarks in
mass-market goods or services, like Starbucks coffee.
57. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
58. Jd. at 535 n.12 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771). The law at issue in San Francisco Arts & Athletics was not an ordinary trademark law,
but whether the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) could ban any unauthorized use ofthe term
"Olympic" for, among other things, nonprofit sports competitions. Jd. at 524-25. The Court found that
"Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols
are likely to be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing,
nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value ofthe
marks." [d. at 539. With respect to the specific use of the term to promote the Gay Olympics, the court
found the possibility of confusion "obvious." Jd. The Court, nonetheless, did not directly engage the
first prong of Central Hudson, and thus did not say that possible confusion satisfies the "false or
misleading" test. Instead, the Court applied the O'Brien test for evaluating content-neutral regulations.
See id. at 535-37 & 537 n.16 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
59. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (declaring that the insurance company's trademarks were
property and protected from use "where adequate alternative avenues of communication exisC)).
60. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979).
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that seek to use a term to attract consumers in the same way as the trademark owner
does. The adequate alternative channels concept has some echoes within trademark
doctrine, which looks to whether a term is necessary for competition to see whether
it should be regarded as generic (and thus unprotectable as a trademark), descriptive
(and thus protectable only to the extent that consumers learn to see it as an indicator
of source), suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. Even so, the label "property" does not
solve boundary problems-for example, whether trademark rights should bar a
defendant's use of a mark on noncompeting goods. In the past, courts using
property rhetoric for trademarks limited that property right to actual sales diversion,
but now trademark rights extend whenever consumers are likely to perceive an
association between producers, even without competition. 61
Friedman and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, as others have noted, are out of
line with the Court's more recent treatment of commercial speech as having
substantial value. 62 As the Court held in Edenfield v. Fane, 63 to sustain a regulation
of nonmisleading speech, the government "must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real.,,64 If the government can avoid that requirement by simply asserting
that the harm is that the speech is misleading, hardly any protection for commercial
speech will be left. It is easy to recast a concern about the persuasive effects of
speech as a concern that the speech misleads consumers by obscuring the relevant
facts. Despite that, the Court accepted blanket legislative judgments in both
Friedman and San Francisco Arts & Athletics. Lower courts have consistently
followed the same cursory analysis with respect to traditional trademark
infringement: confusing uses are misleading and therefore may be enjoined without
consideration of First Amendment interests. 65 The only exceptions involve creative
works such as music and movies, whose uses of marks sometimes lead courts to
invoke free speech concerns. 66

61. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. (forthcoming 2007).
62. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Robert N. Kravitz,
Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 166-67 (1989).
63. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
64. Id. at 770-71.
65. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir.1992)
(finding that misleading commercial speech may be restricted without violating the First Amendment
(citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001,1022 (9th Cir. 1985»); Kelley
Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also, e.g., Robert C.
Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 165-66 (1982) (,'Reliance on the confusion
rationale as the primary basis ofliability has effectively insulated traditional trademark doctrine from
constitutional attack."); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE LT. 147,221 (1998) (,The strongest constitutional justification
for trademark laws is that, properly construed, they prevent only commercial speech that is likely to
cause consumer confusion, and that false or misleading commercial speech can be restricted. ").
66. See, e.g., Mattel,Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894,902 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
reference to marks in a song title is protected by the First Amendment so long as the "title clearly is
relevant to the underlying work," and "does not explicitly mislead as to the source ofthe work"); Cliffs
Notes,Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
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Application in More Conventional Trademark Cases
1.

The Problem of Partially Useful Information

Even conceding that protecting consumers against deception as to source is a
compelling government interest,67 many of trademark law's core presumptions
would disappear if the field were subject to the same analysis as other kinds of
commercial speech regulations. In Zauderer, for example, the Supreme Court
suggested that the First Amendment requires that government interventions into the
commercial speech market be minimal-disclaimers and disclosures are preferred
alternatives to suppressing speech.68 Although the Second Circuit briefly flirted
with using disclaimers to avoid consumer confusion caused by similar trademarks,
disclaimers are not the default remedy in infringement cases, as they would be if
courts applied commercial speech doctrine. 69
The deeper conflict between trademark law and the modern First Amendment
is that information is rarely completely helpful or completely misleading. The idea
that prohibitions on fraud improve the information environment depends on truth
and falsity being pure binaries. Many trademark (and false advertising) cases,
however, are more complicated. A mark may convey useful information to some
while misleading others. Eliminating a use that misleads 15% of consumers but
helps 30% of consumers may make the market less efficient overall, whereas an

expressive element of parodies requires more protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial
products."); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Lanham Act applies
"to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression").
67. Though it may not be compelling, if the goods or services are of equal quality. Judge
Kozinski, who supports full constitutional protection for commercial speech, nonetheless describes
trademark infringement as "essentially a fraud on the consuming public" and thus enjoinable without
concern for the First Amendment. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905. But others have argued that there is no public
interest in prohibiting misrepresentations that do not affect the physical quality of a product or service
since consumers suffer no material loss. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 280 (Cal. 2002)
(Brown, J., dissenting) C'A blanket prohibition offalse or misleading representations [that are unrelated
to the characteristics of the product] would be unconstitutional because the prohibition may stifle the
ability of businesses to comment on public issues."); cf lnfl Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d
67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding "consumer curiosity" is an insufficient justification to override
businesses' First Amendment interests in not disclosing that their milk came from cows given certain
hormones). Not getting what you want while still getting the benefit of your bargain can be seen as a
psychic harm that cannot count in a First Amendment analysis.
68. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (finding that "because
disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions
on speech, 'waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.'" (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,201 (1982))).
69. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 100 I n.9 (2d Cir. 1989) (avoiding the question of
whether a disclaimer cured an otherwise deceptive title where the court found the public interest in free
expression was not outweighed by the public interest of avoiding consumer confusion).
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injunction would be justified if the percentages were reversed. 70
The problem may be easiest to see for descriptive terms that have acquired
secondary meaning. For example, Park 'n Fly is the name of an airport parking lot,
which conveys information about the seller's services but may also serve as an
indicator of a specific source. If another parking lot advertises "Park and Fly!"
many consumers will get useful information, but many others may assume that the
lot is a branch of the Park 'n Fly chain. Similar instances in which some consumers
are informed and others are misled can occur with resale of used goods that may
differ from the factory-original product, or sale of new products which advertise
truthfully that they incorporate other trademarked goods, in which case some
consumers may believe that the trademark owner endorses the new product.
Comparative advertising or claims that "If you like X®, you'll love Y" can help
some consumers make informed choices between competitors while leading others
to conclude that a favorite brand has a new product available. 7 !
The problem of suppressing partially useful information exists independent of
whether there is any chilling effect from the existence of government regulation and
competitor lawsuits. But of course chilling effects do exist. A reseller's fear of
being sued by the original manufacturer, a competitor's fear that Health Selections
frozen dinners will motivate a lawsuit by Healthy Choice, and similar reasonable
apprehensions are likely to deter the adoption and use of marks in contexts where
they would inform some consumers. This chilling effect is increased because a
defendant's good faith bel iefthat marks are not confusing, founded in a study ofthe
relevant market and a trademark search, is insufficient to avoid liability if a court
disagrees with the defendant's evaluation.
A trademark owner's ability to deter competitors' truthful, useful commercial
speech is not the same thing as the ability to suppress political speech. But if it is
true that commercial speech is as relevant and vital to modern citizens as political
speech, then suppressing competition is analogous to silencing political opponents
and certainly merits skepticism. Like partisan officials deciding which political
speech to pursue, trademark owners may see harm where there is only competition.
The paradoxical consequence of this is that infringement law is most dangerous,
from the perspective of commercial speech doctrine, at its core-as applied
between competitors. That is, a plaintiffs motives are most likely to include the

70. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. I, 20-21, 42-43 (1992)
(suggesting that victims of false advertising in the industry prefer damage remedies over injunctive
relief: whereas victims oftrademark infringement need injunctive reliefsince reputational hann is more
difficult to estimate than loss of sales alone ).lnjunctive relief as a mechanism for trademark protection
is generally more justified. See id. at 20-21.
71. Tn cases in which the defendant's use of a mark conveyed infonnation to some consumers,
the First Amendment argument for required disclaimers is strongest. Tn such cases, a simple injunction
against use deprives the nonconfused market participants, who may well be the majority of consumers,
of valuable infonnation about the goods. Commercial speech doctrine requires the government to try
a more moderate solution than total suppression. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("[W]aming[s] or
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer
confusion or deception.").
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desire to suppress truthful speech when it sues a competitor.

2.

Problems in Determining Deception: Who Decides?

Separately, the consequences of rigorous commercial speech protection for
federal trademark registration, which is a governmentally conferred benefit that
provides many advantages in enforcement, could be dramatic.72 Registration of
deceptive marks is barred by the Lanham Act along with scandalous or disparaging
marks.73 But the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) uses limited
evidence to make a deceptiveness determination and has no particular expertise in
assessing consumer behavior or understanding. A recent case, Piazza's Seafood
World, LLC v. Odom/ 4 suggests the potential effects of robust commercial speech
protection on the overall trademark system. The plaintiff sold Chinese-farmed
catfish under the trade names "Cajun Boy" and "Cajun Del ight" and imported 99%
of its products from overseas. 75 Louisiana's "Cajun Statute" provided, "No person
shall advertise, sell, offer or expose for sale, or distribute food or food products as
'Cajun', 'Louisiana Creole', or any derivative thereof unless the food or food
product [was] produced, processed, or manufactured in Louisiana .... ,,76
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that "Piazza's use of the
'Cajun Boy' and 'Cajun Delight' trade names was only potentially misleading, not
actually or inherently misleading, because Piazza largely sells its products to
wholesalers and it labels its products with their country of origin.'m The judges
presumably deemed wholesalers to be sophisticated and attentive to country-oforigin labeling. Though the state's interest in preventing deception was substantial,
the statute went further than necessary to serve that interest because there was no

72. The current statutory provision for refusing registration on grounds of scandalousness or
disparagement in 15 U .S.C. § 1052(a) is particularly hard to reconcile with Central Hudson's protection
for truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of
Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter Under Section 2(a) ofthe Lanham Act: Can One Man's
Vulgarity Be Another's Registered Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 345-47 (1993) (providing
examples of marks refused for registration because of their scandalous nature); Llewellyn Joseph
Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark
Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. TNTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187,231 (2005) (arguing that "section
2(a) violates the First Amendment rights of those who wish to use scandalous or immoral marks in the
course of their commercial enterprises"); Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar
Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 665, 677-79 (2000) (suggesting that, because denial
of registration for scandalous and disparaging marks reduces the financial value of the marks, First
Amendment scrutiny should be applied to section 2(a) to protect forms of expression that may be
discouraged by fmancial disincentives).
73. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 428, amended by
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4982 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.c.
§ 1052(a) (2000)).
74. 448 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2006).
75. Id. at 747.
76. Id. at 747 & n.7.
77. Id. at 753.
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actual deception in this case. 78 As a result, the law, as applied to the plaintiff,
flunked the test set forth in Central Hudson. 79
The reason this case deserves attention from trademark scholars is that the
Lanham Act and coordinate state laws do not distinguish between potentially and
inherently misleading commercial speech. Imagine what would happen if the
plaintiff sought to register its "Cajun Boy" mark and was denied using the PTO's
test for deceptiveness, which does not require the examiner to show actual
deception. so Under the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the plaintiff would have a First
Amendment right to the benefits of federal registration.
Another recent case, this one featuring an opinion by one of the nation's most
highly respected judges, illustrates the serious institutional questions raised by
administrative determinations of falsity-mainly, though, by dodging those
questions. In Native American Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp}] Judge Posner analyzed
the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA),S2 w hich bans selling a product "'in a manner
that falsely suggests it is ... an Indian product.",s3 The court of appeals reversed
a district judge's determination that the IACA, as interpreted by the Indian Arts and
Crafts Board (part of the Department of the Interior), was an unconstitutional
regulation of commercial speech.s4 If the district judge had been correct, the court
of appeals concluded, then trademark law as a whole would also be
unconstitutional-a proposition so ludicrous that to state it was to refute it. s5
This apparently easy victory for trademark infringement and cognate offenses,
however, did not end the court's analysis. Rather, the court went on to address the
merits of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board's interpretation of the IACA as
prohibiting "the unqualified use of the term 'Indian' or ... of the name of an Indian
tribe ... in connection with an art or craft product" on products not made by an
Indian, as defined by the law. s6 First, the court suggested that government
regulation could determine what was true or false about Indian arts and crafts:
In effect the regulation makes "Indian" the trademark denoting
products made by Indians, just as "Roquefort" denotes a cheese
manufactured from sheep's milk cured in limestone caves in the
Roquefort region of France. A non-Indian maker of jewelry
designed to look like jewelry made by Indians is free to advertise

78. [d.
79. Id.
80. 15 U.S.c. § I 052(d) (2000) (mark not registrable if"likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive"). An actual deception requirement would be difficult, especially in the context
of intent-to-use applications. Even with marks used in commerce, the PTO lacks the resources to
conduct a survey on consumer perceptions of a mark.
81. 399 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2005).
82. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-10 (2000)).
83. Native American Arts, 399 F.3d at 873 (quoting § 305e(a)).
84. [d. at 873-74.
85. [d. at 873.
86. Id. at 873 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 309.24(a)(2) (2006)).
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the similarity but ifhe uses the word "Indian" he must qualify the
usage so that consumers aren't confused and think they're buying
not only the kind of jewelry that Indians make, but jewelry that
Indians in fact made. There is no constitutional infirmity.87
This language suggests significant government power over meaning, at least
within reasonable bounds. 88 But Judge Posner then retreated substantially from this
holding, ruling that the Board's regulation did not control the meaning of the law
for a private lawsuit. 89 Instead, the question of whether any particular use of
"Indian" or tribal names was deceptive had to be submitted to the factfinder. 90 The
Board lacked authority to determine what constitutes false advertising and
particularly lacked expertise over what consumers-presumably non-Indian
consumers-were likely to think when they saw advertising material. 91 Thus, the
court affirmed the jury's finding that a non-Indian artist had not violated the IACA
by producing "Indian-style jewelry that is advertised under such names as 'Navajo,'
'Crow,' 'Southwest Tribes,' and 'Zuni Bear' and sold with tags that give
information about the tribe.,,92 This finding is dubious on the merits-it is hard to
see how other information provided with the jewelry could have dispelled the
obvious implication ofTndian manufacture, especially when there was no explicit
disclaimer-but more importantly, the court's conclusion retreats from the idea that
some speech is simply inherently false or misleading.
The holding that a factfinder must determine likely deception in every
individual case seems consistent with much First Amendment jurisprudence. But
it is also a guarantee of costly litigation and increases the likelihood that misleading
speech will be excused, putting the burden of error on the producers of actual
Indian-made jewelry. Moreover, even if courts borrow from defamation
jurisprudence, they need not require totally individualized
determinations-defamation law recognizes some false statements as defamatory
per se, requiring no further proof of damage. Likewise, legislatures could determine
that certain words or phrases actually have a particular meaning, and that ifthey are

87. Id. at 873-74 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
88. One is reminded of Humpty Dumpty's statement, "When luse a word ... it means just what
I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (1896), reprinted in MORE ANNOTATED ALICE 253 (Martin Gardner ed.,
Random House 1990). Humpty's statement is legitimate ifhe was trying to allow himselfroom to revise
and alter his meaning at will without transparency to the people to whom he was speaking. By contrast,
the Board's regulation-like countless definitions found in regulatory schemes-is an attempt to clariry
and stabilize meaning. In either case, "[t]he question is ... which [person] is to be master." Id. But it
is the government's ability to make clear and consistent rules that justifies its asserted mastery over
meamng.
89. See Native American Arts, 399 F.3d at 874.
90. Id. at 874-75.
91. See id. at 874. ("The meaning of 'Indian product' is plausibly within the scope of knowledge
of an Indian Arts and Crafts Board-but not the requisites for proving consumer confusion, especially
when it is not Indians, but non-Indians, who are the principal consumers offaux Indian products .... ").
92. Id. at 873. 876.
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used differently, that is deceptive. Such rules can even have useful informationproducing effects; consider the utility of having a uniform measure of how many
miles a car gets per gallon, or how much "tar" is in a cigarette-both of which
make comparisons easier for consumers than competing definitions. Ifthe meaning
of "Cajun" or "Indian" is up for debate, then consumers have to invest more in
learning the meaning of those terms as used in each individual case, or risk
deception.
Native American Arts highlights two other important aspects of the
constitutionalization of trademark law. First, casting the IACA as a variant of
ordinary trademark law narrows the interests sought to be protected, meaning that
only consumer protection (and derivative protection for producers deemed authentic
by the law) justifies the law. 93 Protections for Native American cultural heritage are
lost, even though cultural protection was a major reason for enacting the IACA. 94
Cultural protection justifications could broaden and narrow the TACA in various
ways, for example, by barring claims of authenticity for art produced by members
of one tribe that imitates the traditional style of another tribe, but at the same time
allowing claims of authenticity by Indian artisans who are not members of an
enrolled tribe. 95 This is part of a broader dynamic that encourages a regulation'S
defenders to define their goal as avoiding falsity, since that is the only aim for
which current First Amendment commercial speech doctrine has any sympathy.
Second, to the extent that courts question the constitutionality of trademark
law, they are more likely to do so in the context of laws that regulate the use of
specific words-as was evident in Native AmericanArts. Government involvement
in shaping the marketplace of speech seems much more salient when lawmakers
have evaluated the deceptive potential of a particular word or set of words. In this
regard, the trademark-like cases are similar to cases in which courts have struck
down FDA rules about what health claims advertisers can make about supplements
and drugs; there too, the courts have second-guessed agency determinations about
deceptiveness, without questioning the idea that false advertising law in general is
plainly constitutiona1. 96
The relatively greater suspicion courts reserve for administrative and legislative
determinations about specific falsehoods indicates that the common law retains its
persuasive pull as a baseline for regulating deceptive speech. But why is a jury
verdict, which may be based on far less evidence than that available to a legislative

93. See Jennie D. Woltz, Note, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 Be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAMTNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LT. 443,
476-78 (2007) (comparing the IACA to trademark law and concluding that the lACA protects consumer
interest at the expense of cultural heritage interests).
94. See id. at 476-77 (arguing that the TACA has failed to protect cultural heritage).
95. See id. at 478-79 (arguing that the TACA's definition of authentic may be both over- and
under-inclusive).
96. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(rejecting the FDA's determination
that certain supplement claims were inherently misleading); Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 128 F.
Supp.2d II (D.D.C. 2000) (suggesting that much ofthe FDA regulation of health claims disseminated
to doctors by drug companies could be unconstitutional).
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body, more trustworthy than a legislative body's determination that a term is
deceptive? A jury represents and defines government power, as First Amendment
doctrines about other private causes of action recognize.
To date, uncertainties in determining falsity have largely been avoided in the
private lawsuit context by accepting the factfinder's determination of likely
deception, ignoring error costs, and presuming irreparable harm to the trademark
owner when the factfinder decides that confusion is likely. These are not
satisfactory solutions from the perspective of First Amendment doctrine because
they do not address the commercial speech distinction between potentially
misleading and actually misleading. One could argue that "actually misleading"
speech can be identified through a consumer surveyor anecdotal evidence from
confused consumers. Even that would require a serious disruption ofthe currenttest
for infringement, which is whether confusion is "likely" and which does not require
evidence of actual confusion for a plaintiff to prevai1. 97 Nor does commercial
speech doctrine have anything like trademark's numerical threshold, in which
confusion among a minority of consumers (around 20% in many cases) is enough
to enjoin a defendant's use even if the majority of consumers get relevant
information from the use.
One possibility suggested by the lawyer regulation cases is that the difference
between inherently misleading speech and potentially misleading speech in First
Amendment doctrine is whether further disclosures can correct the misleading
implications of the challenged speech. If that is the distinction, however, then
consumer surveys are not useful to show actual misleadingness unless they also
show that a disclaimer fails to correct the problem. Most surveys do not show
"inherent" deception because they do not test disclaimers.
C. Final Note on Intent
Another big problem with trademark law from the perspective of mainstream
First Amendment doctrine involves the role of intent. Historically, "passing off'
involved deliberate deception by a competitor, although "the intent [to deceive]
could be inferred from the circumstances.,,98 This requirement disappeared
relatively early in the history of trademark law, but the trend in First Amendmentgoverned doctrines such as libel (including trade libel and product disparagement)
has been the opposite. Some degree of fault-at least negligence-is generally

97. See. e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.
1986) (actual confusion is unnecessary to find infringement).
98. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History a/the Concept a/Goodwill in TrademarkLaw,
86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 565-66 (2006). Trademark historically also used a property theory, granting
exclusive rights in arbitrary or fanciful marks (known as technical trademarks) that had no relevance
to the product before a seller adopted them.ld. at 567-72. Infringement of technical trademarks did not
require proof of fraudulent intent because it was a violation of property rights, like a trespass.ld. at 560.
Courts, however, still linked deception with infringement because use of an arbitrary mark on a
particular product was likely to confuse consumers, and was not likely to be done accidentally or in
good faith.ld. at 564-65,567.
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required before liability can be imposed. This is an application of the narrow
tailoring requirement that restrictions on speech be no greater than necessary to
avoid the harm.99 Essentially, the judgment (rarely fully articulated) is that the gain
in harm-prevention from banning mistaken but non-malicious, or non-negligent,
speech is less than the cost of deterring speech that the speaker cannot verity with
perfect certainty. One could balance the costs and benefits differently-a good faith
but wrong belief that a drug cures cancer, for example, could do much more harm
than its suppression would-but many trademark cases will not involve risks to
health and safety from allowing the speech to continue.
Intent requirements help decrease the chilling effects of speech prohibitions
because they allow speakers to speak with confidence after a reasonable
investigation. The price of freeing speech is that there is no liability even if the
speakers are actually mistaken and their mistakes do harm. Currently, trademark
law imposes liability for honest mistakes, creating great uncertainty among
businesses. loo This uncertainty may be worth the information costs it exacts, but
courts have yet to perform that balancing. No-fault liability combines with the other
features of trademark law noted above to make trademark unusually indifferent to
the costs of error, costs which are elsewhere considered to be constitutionally
problematic when they affect truthful speech.

TV. CONCLUSION
Taking modern First Amendment doctrine seriously would have significant
effects on the Lanham Act, affecting everything from the standard of proof to the
definition of what counts as misleading. Trademark law's property-like features
could insulate it from First Amendment transformation better than most types of
false advertising law, but the constitutional constraints on libel law-which also
protect property-like interests in reputation-show that property concepts are not
a panacea. First Amendment protection for commercial speech against government
regulation and private lawsuits is increasing simultaneously with trademark's
expansion to new areas-from dilution to geographic indications. Courts adopting
First Amendment principles to cabin expansive applications oftrademark law may
thus find that the same reasoning reaches trademark's core commercial functions.
The results are not foreordained. Courts may refuse to apply First Amendment

99. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
100. Barton Beebe's empirical research indicates that intent is, in fact, central to many cases'
outcomes. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study ofthe Multi/actor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1626-31 (2006). Nonetheless, as a matter of doctrine, intent to deceive
consumers is unnecessary to a fmding oftrademark infringement. See id. Moreover, even when courts
do evaluate intent, many look at the defendant's intent to copy the plaintiff, which is not the same thing
as an intent to confuse the public. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. V. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d
198, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2000). There are numerous reasons a defendant might want to copy, especially
in cases of descriptive terms that also have trademark meaning, or trade apparel that might increase the
aesthetic appeal of the product or signal functional benefits. First Amendment doctrine's definition of
intent generally looks to knowledge, recklessness, or even negligence, with respect to factual falsity,
which is often easier for speakers to identify than consumer reaction to their speech.
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commercial speech doctrine with the same rigor to the Lanham Act as they have
when striking down other government regulations. After all, courts and legislatures
have generally believed that there were good reasons to relax the common law
standards requiring intentional fraud and proofthatthe trademark owner was losing
sales to an infringer. 101
I am largely in favor of core trademark infringement doctrine as it stands now;
what I find problematic is special pleading for trademark. If modern trademark law
is generally constitutional, then other forms of commercial speech regulation based
on concerns for deception should also receive favorable treatment. Whether one
prefers that courts should constitutionalize trademark law or cast a similarly
favorable eye on other commercial speech regulations, it is important to recognize
that trademark law is part ofthe modern regulatory apparatus. When we decide to
allow consumer protection to trump freedom of commercial speech, we must do
more than simply declare "false and misleading" commercial speech outside the
boundaries of the First Amendment. Rather, multiple elements of the relevant
statutory or regulatory scheme must be evaluated for how well they balance
advertisers' interests in speaking truthfully with consumers' interests in avoiding
falsehood. Examining the presumptions and burdens of proof found in trademark
infringement law can thus provide useful lessons for other types of commercial
speech regulation.

101. See generally McKenna, supra note 61.

HeinOnline -- 58 S. C. L. Rev. 756 2006-2007

